On 1 April, a day traditionally reserved for the publication of “fake news”, independent Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta ran a story detailing the internment of over 100 gay or bisexual men in Chechnya, a Russian republic in the Caucasus that was the setting for two devastating civil wars in the 1990s and 2000s. The Novaya Gazeta report cited regional security service officials, LGBT rights activists and eyewitness accounts in its claims regarding the treatment by Chechen police of those detained, reporting that many had been beaten and at least three killed.
The article provoked a range of reactions. A press spokesman for Ramzan Kadyrov, the head of the republic, denied the allegations, observing that there were no homosexuals in Chechnya to detain. Disturbingly, according to the spokesman, any homosexuals resident in Chechnya would likely already have been the subject of an honour killing by their own families. Meanwhile, the alleged abductions and torture were condemned abroad at all levels, with the UN, EU and national governments calling on the Russian authorities to release all detainees and investigate the matter. On 5 May, Russian president Vladimir Putin said that he would speak with senior law enforcement officials about what he described as “rumours”. The following day, Kadyrov reiterated his denial but added that he would cooperate with any official inquiry.
If an investigation were to be launched, it would represent an unprecedented level of interference by the Russian authorities in Chechen affairs. Chechnya is notable among Russia’s regions for the relatively free hand Putin has allowed Kadyrov since appointing him head of the republic in 2007. This is largely a quid pro quo for Kadyrov’s effectiveness in the suppression of dissent there: the prevention of another Chechen War sits atop Russia’s agenda in the Caucasus, as evidenced by considerable state investment in the region – at present, 81% of Chechnya’s budget comes from federal subsidies.
However, the drain on the country’s finances in a time of recession has led many Russian commentators to question the sustainability of Putin’s pact with Kadyrov. Their concerns are aggravated by a series of more recent actions taken by the Chechen leader that have escalated tensions between the central and regional governments. Since its annexation of Crimea in 2014, Kadyrov has used Russia’s enhanced global influence to grow Chechnya’s own importance within the wider federation. Armed conflict in Ukraine and Syria has seen Chechen battalions posted there, with many of these soldiers, like Kadyrov himself, having initially fought against Russia in the 1990s before switching sides. Moreover Kadyrov, a practicing Muslim, is widely reported to be a key foreign policy asset in Russia’s relations with countries in the Middle East, where he exercises influence both with national leaders and within the Chechen diaspora there.
But not everything Kadyrov has done has been in line with Kremlin policy. In early 2015, the murder of Boris Nemtsov, a leading opposition politician, brought the conviction of two men with ties to the Chechen security services, arousing suspicions that the order came from within Kadyrov’s inner circle. Nemtsov’s murder represented a sharp deviation from Russian state policy when dealing with opposition politicians and was unlikely to have been sanctioned by Moscow. In 2016, Kadyrov was the subject of protests by Russian opposition activists after taking to Instagram to label them “enemies of the people”. The Chechen leader has picked fights not just with Putin’s rivals but with his friends – for several years Kadyrov has been engaged in a public struggle with Rosneft, a large national oil company, for the control of regional energy assets. In these conflicts, and others, the Russian government has been uncharacteristically laissez-faire, which appears only to have further convinced Kadyrov of his unique importance to Putin. A month after the Instagram scandal, Kadyrov announced that he would step down ahead of parliamentary elections later that year. This apparent challenge to Moscow to find a replacement went unmet – Kadyrov was subsequently re-elected, implicitly but resoundingly confirming his position as the only man who could keep Chechnya in line.
To many observers, including not just Kremlin critics but now also pro-government nationalists, Kadyrov’s reach within Russia has looked increasingly like overreach, and Chechnya’s limited autonomy in the federation closer to de-facto independence. In several ways, Chechnya resembles a more intense microcosm of Russia: an authoritarian strongman with a cult of personality standing atop a power vertical, reliant on oil reserves while building up military ones, and invoking religion and traditional values to reinforce his legitimacy. Kadyrov has taken policies broadly popular on a national level – the suppression of political opposition and intolerance towards sexual minorities – and brought them to a violent conclusion within his jurisdiction. In the same way Russia’s much-publicised 2013 law prohibiting “gay propaganda” to minors was widely seen as a political move to consolidate support among the country’s Orthodox Christians, Kadyrov’s alleged internment of homosexuals in Chechnya may also serve as a policy tool, giving him a way to test the federal government’s resolve and see how far his authority truly extends. Putin’s decision to investigate or not, and whether or not more “rumours” emerge, will go a long way to answering this question.
How much longer Kadyrov continues to push the boundaries depends on the extent of Moscow’s patience. Whether intentionally or not, by publicly reminding people of the limits of Kremlin control over Chechnya, Kadyrov is increasingly making Putin look weak, a narrative that is creeping into Russian media analysis and one which represents a stain on the president’s public image that may prove unacceptable. Should Russo-Chechen relations persist along their current trajectory, Putin could decide Kadyrov is no longer worth the investment. If he were to cut back on federal subsidies or dismiss him from his post altogether – at this point his only leverage over the Chechen leader – Kadyrov, whose allegiances have changed before, would be forced to assess the benefits of maintaining loyalty to Moscow. Despite his repeated endorsements of Putin’s leadership, Kadyrov would find himself at the head of a republic still harbouring resentment against Russian rule, and of a veteran private army reported at 30,000-strong and counting. If tensions continue to escalate, the Russian and Chechen leaders may see their tug-of-war end in yet another real one.
Kadyrov timeline:
May 2004 – Kadyrov’s father, Akhmad, is assassinated in a bomb blast in the Chechen capital, Grozny. The younger Kadyrov is appointed the region’s deputy prime minister.
February 2007 – Putin appoints Kadyrov head of the Chechen Republic. The latter begins consolidating his support in the region’s military and political structures.
April 2009 – The Second Chechen War officially ends with the removal of Russian troops from the region.
April 2012 – Kadyrov is sworn in as head of the republic for a second term.
December 2014 – The first reports emerge of Chechen battalions fighting on the separatist side against the Ukrainian government in the Donbass region.
February 2015 – Russian opposition leader Boris Nemtsov is murdered in Moscow. Two Chechen nationals are later convicted.
May 2015 – Luiza Goylabieva, a seventeen-year-old Chechen woman, marries a police chief in Grozny, allegedly against her will. Though the Russian government turns a blind eye, Kadyrov publicly supports the wedding.
December 2015 – Putin accedes to Kadyrov’s request for the transfer of Chechnya-based federal oil assets to regional control.
January 2016 – In a series of public appearances, Kadyrov describes opposition to the Russian government as “enemies of the people”.
February 2016 – Kadyrov announces he will step down later that year at the end of his second term in office. He subsequently reverses his decision and is re-elected with nearly 98% of the vote.
December 2016 – Chechen battalions are reportedly posted to Syria to fight in the country’s civil war. Kadyrov later confirms the involvement of armed units from Chechnya in operations there.
April 2017 – Reports first emerge of the detention, torture and murder of suspected homosexuals by Chechen law enforcement.
