Life without the FARC: Colombia's Bacrim business

Since October 2012, most of the local and international attention has been focused on the peace negotiations between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which remain ongoing in Havana, Cuba. However, in the meantime, Colombia’s organised criminal groups (known locally as ‘bandas criminales emergentes’ or ‘Bacrim’) have expanded their power across the country. Los Urabeños (also known as ‘Clan Úsuga’ or ‘Los Urabá’), the largest of the Bacrim groups, has sophisticated drug-trafficking, extortion and kidnapping operations across northern Colombia, as well as internationally. Seven months after launching ‘Operation Agamemnon’ to dismantle Los Urabeños’ criminal networks, authorities have still yet to capture the group’s leader, Darío Antonio Úsuga David (alias ‘Otoniel’). Capturing or killing him, however, is unlikely to fundamentally weaken this group. Beyond any potential FARC-government peace agreement, Bacrim groups such as Los Urabeños are likely to pose long-term operational risks in Colombia. Furthermore, their numbers and capabilities are likely to be bolstered by any future FARC demobilisation, given existing ties between the two groups. 

Some of the most well-known Bacrims, including Los Urabeños, Los Rastrojos, Los Paisas, and Águilas Negras, emerged as splinter groups of the now defunct United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC), a right-wing paramilitary group which demobilised between 2006 and 2008. Unlike the FARC or the smaller National Liberation Army (ELN), Bacrim groups typically do not carry out attacks on government infrastructure or security forces. They do not regularly grab headlines and their criminal command structures remain largely opaque. As a result, the operational threats these groups pose are often overlooked or underestimated. Whilst not their principal forms of income, kidnapping and extortion remain very much a part of their daily operations. One need not look any further than Colombia’s largest port terminal of Buenaventura to understand the potential operational threats that Bacrim groups pose. There, Los Urabeños and rival group La Empresa have dominated Buenaventura since 2008, creating invisible territorial borders, extorting small and large businesses, and constraining the movements and activities of local residents. Beyond Buenaventura, Los Urabeños has demonstrated its control over cities like Santa Marta and Montería, as well as multiple municipalities in the departments of Magdalena, Córdoba, Sucre, Bolívar and Antioquia. In January 2012, the group virtually paralysed transport and commerce in the north of the country after ordering a 48-hour armed strike and offering rewards of USD 1,000 for every police officer’s head.

Bacrim groups are also influential among local politicians. In some departments, this enables them to operate with impunity under the protection of corrupt local politicians. Colloquially referred to as ‘bacrimpolítica’, numerous local politicians and even congressmen have been arrested in Antioquia, La Guajira, Córdoba and Chocó, for their ties to Bacrim groups. At a local level, Bacrim groups like Los Urabeños are known to support and finance local mayoral candidates. A July 2015 report published by a Colombian non-governmental organisation (NGO) alleged that at least 140 candidates running for political office in Colombia have ties to criminal groups, including Bacrims. ‘Parapolítica’, as it is known locally, originates from as far back as the 1960s when the government legalised certain self-defence groups as part of a strategy to combat far-left militant groups. The full extent of this alliance was exposed during the presidency of Álvaro Uribe, and by 2012, 139 members of Congress were under investigation for links to the AUC. Apart from Bacrim kidnapping and extortion risks, ties between these groups and corrupt politicians therefore also pose reputational and compliance risks for companies operating in Colombia.
 
Los Urabeños is by far the largest and most powerful Bacrim group in Colombia. The group currently has an estimated 2,000- 2,400 members in 264 municipalities in 23 of the country’s 32 departments. Beyond Colombia, the group reportedly has operations in Argentina, Brazil, Honduras, Peru and Spain. In May 2014, Spanish authorities arrested 13 Los Urabeños members who were planning to kidnap a Colombian national living in Barcelona, and demand a USD 18.5 million ransom for his release. Despite the arrest of over 6,700 Los Urabeños operatives since 2010, authorities have been unable to dismantle this Bacrim group. The fierce loyalty Los Urabeños retains through a mix of patronage and fear in Antioquia’s Urabá region has made the government’s task all the more difficult. In particular, the government has prioritised capturing or killing Otoniel. To put the importance of capturing Otoniel into perspective, Operation Agamemnon’s 1,200-strong force is twice the size of the 600-man ‘Search Bloc’ that hunted down Pablo Escobar in the early 1990s. Yet, capturing Otoniel is unlikely to spell the end of Los Urabeños. When Otoniel’s brother and former head of the group, Juan de Dios Úsuga (alias ‘Giovanni’), was killed in early 2012, Los Urabeños continued to grow and expand its operations, superseding rival group Los Rastrojos in 2013. In this respect, the Colombian government should know that a kingpin strategy is unlikely to work. Los Urabeños is particularly dangerous because of the group’s documented links to the FARC. Apart from clear evidence that they collaborate in Colombia’s drug trade, Los Urabeños and the FARC reportedly share intelligence, trade in arms, and divide territory between themselves. Otoniel himself had a brief stint in the FARC between 1992 and 1996, and his cousin is currently a FARC linchpin in Antioquia. In the past, the two groups have even collaborated in attacks on security forces, most notably in September 2014, when a joint Urabeños-FARC attack in Córdoba left seven police officers dead and five others injured. Given already established links between the two groups, Los Urabeños stands to benefit from any demobilisation of FARC militants. Some analysts have even started referring to a hybrid ‘Farcrim’ criminal group. Indeed, there is no guarantee that all or even most of the FARC’s estimated 8,000 guerrillas will demobilise if a peace agreement is reached. When faced with a choice between prison, a slum on the outskirts of Bogotá, or continued involvement in a very lucrative drug trade, many FARC militants are expected to lapse back into criminality, possibly with Los Urabeños or other Bacrim groups. The potential influx of demobilised FARC militants into Bacrim groups may bolster their capacity to carry out more sophisticated terrorist attacks, kidnappings and extortion rackets across Colombia. 

A few months ago, the FARC peace talks appeared to be hanging by a thread as militants carried out a wave of terrorist attacks across the country. Now, an end to the world’s longest-running war seems inevitable as Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos and FARC supreme commander, Rodrigo Londoño, recently reached an agreement to end the conflict. In a post-FARC world, the government’s kingpin strategy is unlikely to fundamentally weaken Bacrims, and groups such as Los Urabeños are likely to continue to pose significant long-term operational risks in Colombia. Colombia