Half-Life: The Fears and Realities of a Dirty Bomb

Like many extremist groups that have come before it, Islamic State (IS) has demonstrated a keen interest in developing its unconventional weapons, notably through the use of chemical compounds on the front lines. However, over the last few months, a number of events have indicated that the group is actively pursuing a radiological agenda, with the intention of using radioactive materials in future attacks. While the effectiveness of radiological weapons and IS’s technical abilities to construct them appear to remain low, the group’s clear interest in diversifying its tactics and arsenal are nonetheless concerning.

On 22 March 2016, three coordinated bombings took place in Belgium, with two at Brussels Airport in Zaventem, and one at Maalbeek metro station. IS claimed responsibility for the attacks, stating that it was “in response to their [Belgium] aggression against it [IS]”. While the attack itself was undertaken by IS militants using more conventional explosives, the events leading up to and following the Brussels attacks indicated that the group had considered nuclear targets and weapons. Four months before the attacks, Belgian authorities discovered several hours of video footage monitoring the home of a Belgian nuclear researcher who worked at Dohel-1, one of the seven nuclear production sites in the country. The footage was discovered during a raid on a suspected safehouse linked to IS, and led to speculation that the perpetrators of the Brussels attacks had considered either detonating the bombs at Dohel-1, or forcing the Belgian nuclear researcher to obtain radiological materials for them. Two days after the Brussels attacks, Belgian media sources reported that a security guard employed at Belgium’s national radioactive elements institute at Fleurus was found shot dead in his home, although the circumstances surrounding his death remained unclear.

Reports by the International Atomic Energy Agency on the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials indicate that “insider” thefts of these materials are a growing concern. Further, specific intelligence has demonstrated that thefts of radioactive materials by groups linked to IS have taken place in recent months, and that IS intends to use the stolen materials in future attacks.

The likelihood of an extremist group such as IS obtaining and detonating an actual nuclear bomb is very remote, given the security surrounding such weapons. However, it would be relatively easy for militants to obtain radiological materials; radioactive materials such as cobalt-60 (used in food irradiation), strontium-90 (cancer radiotherapy), cesium-137 (oil exploration) and americium-241 (smoke detectors) are often poorly secured and readily available from military, medical, academic, and industrial sites. Once these materials are obtained, militants would have several options depending on the material procured and the desired outcome from its use. The most obvious use of radioactive material by extremist groups would be in a radiological dispersal device (RDD), or so-called “dirty bomb”. A dirty bomb is an ordinary explosive bomb to which radioactive material has been added. The blast of a dirty bomb is therefore intended to spread the radioactive material, as well as directly injure bystanders as a conventional explosive would. 

To an extremist group, the value of a dirty bomb lies in the psychological reaction, namely the general public’s fear of and perceptions surrounding radiation. In reality, a dirty bomb is as dangerous as a conventional explosive device, given that the largest number of victims would be killed outright by the explosion. The radiation dose itself from an RDDis likely to be very low; for example, a bomb with a radioactive cobalt-60 rod would deliver an average dose of a few tenths of a rem for bystanders within a kilometer of the initial blast. Since the average individual is annually exposed to approximately 0.3-0.4 rem from natural radioactive sources, the likelihood of developing radiation sickness or cancer in the long term from a dirty bomb is very low.

However, the facts surrounding the impact of a RDD will likely do little to assuage public panic in the event of an actual radiological attack, and the long-term consequences would have a significant impact. As was demonstrated in Japan in 2011, where around 1600 people died while evacuating the areas near to Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant, panic over potential radiation exposure could result in even more casualties and disrupt rescue and evacuation efforts. Further, the area in which the RDD was detonated would remain off-limits for several months for decontamination, and could include building demolition and soil replacement.

Whatever IS’s current capabilities, their nuclear ambitions are nonetheless a growing concern. A radiological attack, particularly in a densely-populated region, would result in significant panic that would undoubtedly suit IS’s agenda.