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From Calypso to Caliphate: Islamic State Influence in Trinidad and Tobago

Recent reports have raised concerns about the increased influence of the Islamic State in the Caribbean. CARILEE OSBORNE explores the drivers of and possible implications for rising radicalisation in the region.
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The threat of returning Caribbean foreign fighters will therefore remain focused on their home countries.
Until recently, news media outlets had largely focussed their reporting on the Islamic State (IS)’s foreign fighter phenomenon to individuals travelling from the Middle East, North Africa and Europe. It has come as a surprise then to many that Trinidad and Tobago (T&T) is now believed to be one of the largest per capita contributors of IS foreign fighters to Iraq and Syria. Official estimates from late 2016 put the number of fighters at between 100 and 130 people, while opposition politicians claim that there may be as many as 400; a staggering number for a country with a population of approximately 1.3 million people. While the likelihood of an attack in the region remains low, primarily as a result of its geographical position and the existence of higher priority targets in Europe, understanding the reasons behind the high number of IS sympathisers in the country is crucial in developing effective counter-terrorism measures.

As in other regions, the drivers for radicalisation on the islands have been complex, encompassing historical links to Islamist extremism, rising levels of socio-economic inequality and poor race relations.

While there is no clear evidence of transnational terrorist cells currently operating in T&T, domestic extremism has been a problem historically. In particular, the Jamaat Al Muslimeen (JAM) gained prominence in the 1980s as a Black Sunni Muslim group, which staged a coup attempt in 1990 over perceived socioeconomic inequality in the country. While the group has since denounced violence and appears to have reformed, its legacy continues to influence young Trinidadians today. With poor economic prospects and increasingly high crime rates in certain areas of the islands, many young black Trinidadians do not believe the government is doing enough for them. Such discontent over socio-economic and security grievances, along with the historical role of JAM’s ideology, has driven radicalisation among these communities. Indeed, those who have left T&T to fight alongside IS largely fit a particular profile. Between 70 and 90 percent are reportedly young black converts to Islam, echoing the original demographic make-up of JAM. These new converts have proven more susceptible to IS radicalisation, however, as they have a limited understanding of the religion and may therefore be influenced by extremist interpretations that draw on piecemeal elements of the Quran.

The case of one of the most prominent Trinidadian nationals fighting for IS, Shane Crawford, also known as Abu Sa’d at- Trinidadi, demonstrates this confluence of radicalisation drivers in the country.

Crawford was a convert to Islam and was arrested in 2011 during a state of emergency in the country intended to address rising crime levels. Initially accused of plotting to kill the prime minister, Crawford was later released along with hundreds of others who were wrongfully detained at the time. Despite being released, the wrongful branding of him as a terrorist inhibited him from finding employment, which his mother notes contributed to his radicalisation. In addition to his prison experience, reports indicate that Crawford and other foreign fighters were, at a time, linked to JAM. Umar Abdullah, a leader in the Muslim community who was involved in the 1990 coup attempt, has noted that Crawford and others who left for Syria were influenced by Abdullah Al Faisal, a radical Jamaican cleric convicted in the UK of urging his followers to murder non-Muslims. Crawford and others reportedly left a JAM-affiliated mosque after Umar refused to condone a retaliatory attack when a member of their mosque was killed. Crawford has since criticised JAM in IS propaganda, citing the group’s failure to successfully carry out the coup in 1990.

The US government has expressed concern regarding Caribbean radicalisation. US President Donald Trump is reported to have spoken with his T&T counterpart in February 2017 in this regard. As IS loses ground in Iraq and Syria, more fighters are likely to attempt to return home. While some media reports have cited the proximity of Caribbean to the US as a threat, nationals from almost all Caribbean countries require visas for the US, and will thus face stringent security vetting before being allowed to travel to the country.

The threat of returning Caribbean foreign fighters will therefore remain focused on their home countries. Crawford himself alluded to this shift in IS tactics during a recent propaganda interview. Rather than calling on supporters to join the group in Syria, he encouraged them to carry out attacks in their home countries, focusing on European and US embassies in particular. Foreign-owned oil and gas assets in the Caribbean are also likely to be attractive targets for attack.

Thus far, the T&T government’s response to this threat has been relatively lax. Until December 2016, IS was not proscribed in T&T law. Amid mounting pressure due to concerns over domestic terrorism, however, the T&T government has introduced a 31-part bill aimed at countering the terrorism threat. The bill targets a variety of concerns, including travel to conflict zones, online radicalisation and the funding of terrorist organisations. It also introduces measures to prevent returnee fighters from re-entering T&T, allowing authorities to arrest and launch legal processes against these suspects. While such provisions are important, and in line with similar counter-terrorism measures elsewhere, they nevertheless ultimately fail to address the grievances of communities that are vulnerable to radicalisation, suggesting that the threat will persist in the long term.

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