Deconstructing Yemen's civil war
Since late January 2015, Yemen has been embroiled in a civil conflict involving an array of local, regional, and international actors. As northern-based Houthi militias advanced across the country in a matter of weeks, reportedly backed by Iran and accompanied by forces loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, Saudi Arabia and a number of its Gulf allies began an aerial bombing campaign, following a request for assistance from the internationally-recognised Yemeni President, Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi. Consequently, the international media has tended to represent the conflict in Yemen as a sectarian proxy war between Shi’a Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia. In reality, the Yemen conflict evades neat classifications and simple explanations.
The current turmoil has its roots in dynamics that have unfolded over decades, with the most recent crisis being intimately connected to the Yemeni revolution of 2011, in which a popular national uprising resulted in Saleh’s removal from power. Subsequently, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), a supranational organisation comprising a number of Gulf States, facilitated the installation of a transitional government in 2012 under Saleh’s vice president, Hadi, in a process strongly led by Saudi Arabia. Despite GCC backing, the transitional government failed to meet popular expectations, and Hadi’s fragile support base collapsed amidst a declining economy. It was within this context that the Houthi-Saleh alliance emerged, as the historically-marginalised Houthis capitalised on the growing political vacuum to expand their territorial control. Saleh was quick to recognise an opportunity to position himself once again at the centre of Yemeni politics, and pledged military and financial support to the Houthi’s campaign.
The Houthis have been overwhelmingly presented as an Iranian proxy, primarily by Saudi Arabia, and increasingly by global media accounts, with a common adherence to Shi’a Islam frequently cited as underpinning the Iran-Houthi relationship. This has given the impression that Tehran possesses substantial political influence over the Houthis, and that recent Houthi territorial gains can be attributed to Iranian material support. It is apparent that this assumption has driven Saudi fears over growing Iranian influence on its borders. What is less clear is the extent to which Iranian influence and support lies behind the Houthi’s political ambitions and recent successes. For instance, recent reports allege that the Houthis captured Sana’a in September 2014 against advice given by Iran. In addition, even the notion of a shared sectarian identity is suspect; most Houthis belong to the Zaydi sect of Shi’ism, which is theologically distinct from the Twelver Shi’ism followed by the majority of Iranians.
Framing the Yemeni conflict as a sectarian-fuelled proxy war also obscures the complexity of the various relationships and grievances of different competing groups.
The international media has tended to represent the conflict in Yemen as a sectarian proxy war between Shi’a Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia. In reality, the Yemen conflict evades neat classifications and simple explanations.
For example, militia fighters in southern Yemen have been described as ‘pro-Hadi’ based on their opposition to the Houthi-Saleh alliance’s advance. This impression was reinforced by Hadi’s escape from Sana’a to the southern coastal city of Aden in mid-February, with the south often being described as Yemen’s ‘last government stronghold’. However, the southern provinces have long harboured dissatisfaction with the central government, with demands for southern secession fuelling Yemen’s civil war in 1994. Similarly, despite a shared sectarian identity, there is nothing indicating that the Houthi-Saleh relationship is a permanent feature, as evidenced by Saleh’s efforts at waging war against the Houthis on no less than six separate occasions between 2004 and 2010. The alliance is marked more strongly by common short-term political interests and convenience rather than by religiously-inspired loyalty.
Other important factors also drive the conflict. In eastern Yemen, a plethora of tribal militias have increasingly rejected the authority of any kind of central government, and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), firmly opposed to Houthi authority, has exploited the disorder to expand its own activities; it has reportedly been consolidating relationships with former military officers. In this light, sectarian tensions only form a superficial layer to what is fundamentally a local political and territorial contest involving a multitude of armed factions.
Nonetheless, sectarianism is likely to remain a central feature of the various narratives surrounding the Yemeni conflict. Sectarian identities are often exploited in attempts to mobilise popular support, and appeals to Shi’a or Sunni solidarity may well be used by groups such as the Houthis or AQAP as the fighting wears on. Similarly, even if the proxy war label is debated, outside actors will continue to play a role in the conflict. As long as Yemen’s warring factions are confident of Saudi or Iranian support, they are less likely to be motivated to consider a negotiated settlement. However, an over-emphasis on sectarian and proxy war narratives threatens to overshadow one essential point: it is local actors and their interests that are central to Yemen’s civil war – and it is these local actors who must be part of any solution to the conflict.