US presidential candidates’ foreign policies are in sharp focus before the polls open in early November, particularly in the Middle East where the US has a long-standing history of engagement. Since the War on Terror, successive presidents Barack Obama, Donald Trump, and Joe Biden have each aimed to reduce US military presence and diplomatic engagement in the Middle East, with varying degrees of success. But the region’s geopolitical importance consistently draws sitting presidents’ attention back in, most recently as the Israel-Palestine conflict threatens to escalate into a wider regional crisis with longer-term repercussions for stability.

Although both Trump and Kamala Harris have pledged support for Israel, neither have yet outlined a detailed Middle East strategy, or specific approach to mounting tensions among regional actors like Israel, Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran. Nevertheless, Trump's first term and Harris’s experience as vice president suggest they will take markedly different approaches in defining the role of the US in the region – from military involvement to mediation and humanitarian assistance – in the coming years.

Trump 2.0: A shift from the status quo

During the presidential campaign both Trump and Harris have largely avoided presenting a detailed foreign policy agenda, instead focusing on key domestic issues, particularly the state of the economy. For example, Trump has not specified whether he would support ongoing ceasefire negotiations between Israel, Hamas and Hezbollah, or continue backing a two-state solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict. However, his goal of reducing US involvement in the Middle East is likely to remain, shaped by his approach to regional conflict and disputes alongside his personal style of diplomacy.

As president, Trump often prioritised personal relationships and direct negotiations with world leaders, including in Israel, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Critics of Trump argue that this approach led to unpredictability, sidelining institutions like the State Department, and creating uncertainty among both US allies and rivals in the Middle East as to what the US would do next. In contrast, former Trump administration officials, including former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, contend that his methods in fact emphasised "peace through strength," for example, by serving as an effective deterrent against key rivals, such as Iran.

Some of Trump's initiatives and actions, including the Abraham Accords and relocating the US Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, showcased his ability to achieve tangible outcomes. However, these actions also proved to be contentious. With regard to Israel and Palestine, in June 2024, Trump told Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to “do what you have to do” and “get the war done,” indicating he may give Israel more leeway to manage the conflict, as long as it comes to an end. As tensions escalate between Israel and Iran amid Israel's expanding military operations against Hezbollah, this approach may intensify the ongoing conflict in Lebanon, and could even encourage direct Iranian strikes against regional oil infrastructure, or intensified involvement of Iranian proxies like the Yemen-based Houthis. However, Hezbollah, and by extension Iran, have arguably suffered significantly in the latest intensification of the conflict. The promise of a more forceful US backing of Israel could in fact see both players tread more cautiously to avoid even further setbacks.

Normalisation deals between Israel and Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia, will also likely remain a key objective under Trump. However, the security landscape has changed significantly and such agreements may be difficult to achieve. Saudi Arabia – a diplomatic and economic heavyweight in the region – has stated that there will be no normalisation of its relations with Israel without the establishment of a Palestinian state, and Israel has shown no signs of halting its military activity against Hamas. As long as the conflict persists, further normalisation agreements will be difficult for regional states to justify to their domestic constituencies.

Harris: Staying the course

In most ways, Harris will likely follow in Biden’s footsteps, upholding the diplomatic status quo, strengthening partnerships with regional players, and enhancing cooperation with multilateral institutions. However, the stalled state of the conflict and shifts in US domestic opinion will also likely see a potential Harris administration attempt to evolve its approach.

Harris has stated she has no plans to alter the current policy of supporting Israel politically and militarily, while continuing to pursue traditional diplomatic channels to resolve the conflict. She has publicly supported a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, and is expected to rely on Gulf partners like Qatar and Egypt to continue their mediation efforts, despite limited progress in negotiations so far. Harris aligns with the current administration's support for a two-state solution, but has been more vocal than Biden in calling on Israel to protect civilians and respect Palestinian self-determination as she attempts to navigate a Democratic electoral coalition increasingly divided over Israel and Palestine. Netanyahu has frustrated Biden and his administration with his resistance to their mediation efforts, to the extent that some senior Democrats and Israeli commentators have accused him of trying to influence the election for Trump. In a recent interview, Harris notably demurred on saying whether Netanyahu was a US ally, instead emphasising the wider relationship between the US and Israel. Freed from immediate electoral concerns, an incoming Harris administration may increase pressure on Netanyahu to reach a diplomatic solution, for example by supporting sanctions on Israeli settlers for allegedly inciting violence against civilians in the West Bank. On 15 October, the Biden-Harris administration gave Israel a public ultimatum to boost Gaza aid within 30 days or face a cut in US military support, which may be indicative of Harris’s potential approach.

Harris’s expected policies represent a contrasting approach to managing regional relationships compared to Trump’s. However, with the current security environment already heralding further conflict in the short-term, and prolonged regional instability in the longer term, there is uncertainty whether staying the course will be enough to prevent rising tensions and conflict spillover.

Uncertain influence

Several internal and external factors will shape the success of Harris and Trump’s strategies, and the US’s continued role in the Middle East. Players like Iran and Hezbollah continue to be significant disruptors, maintaining the capability to alter prevailing security and geopolitical dynamics in the region, challenging US decision-makers’ ability to respond rapidly to evolving dynamics. Meanwhile, key regional players like Saudi Arabia and the UAE have become increasingly assertive, solidifying their status and leverage as 'middle powers' capable of navigating the diverse agendas of incoming US presidents.

As the Israel-Palestine conflict moves beyond localised skirmishes, stoking longstanding tensions, shifting regional power dynamics and changing the region’s security landscape, both Harris and Trump face a daunting task. As seen with previous wars, like the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, and the 2006 Lebanon war, miscalculations in the response to regional issues could deepen conflict and delay solutions. These considerations will continue to challenge the US approach to the Middle East in the coming years.