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Boxed In: Niger's Geographical Vulnerability and the Regional Militant Threat

The encroachment of neighbouring insurgencies on Niger seems inevitable, with militants in the north and south east seemingly determined to carry out renewed attacks against Nigerien interests, write Gabrielle Reid and Grant Caswell
Niger is geographically vulnerable. With Libya to the north, Mali to the west and Nigeria’s northeastern states to the south, the country has long been a hotspot for illicit smuggling and militant activity. However, neighbouring insurgencies have recently begun to encroach on its territory, presenting a growing threat to the operating environment in this resource-rich country. Evidence suggests that Boko Haram seems set to bolster its activity in the south east Diffa region, while renewed threats by Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) against uranium operations in the north come amid a potential strategy shift by the trans-Sahel group. Yet, with its economy reliant on outlying and often isolated mining sites, Niger can ill afford an attack against a foreign owned operation on its watch.

In the south, the Nigeria-based Islamist militant group, Boko Haram, has taken advantage of the country’s weak governance and porous borders to lead a growing insurgency on Nigerien territory. Southern villages such as Yébi, Kablewa and Toumour, in the administrative region of Diffa, have been targeted in a number of attacks in the last year in reprisal assaults linked to Niger’s participation in regional counterinsurgency efforts. These culminated in the strategic attack on Bosso in June 2016, which marked the first territorial claim by Boko Haram in Niger and resulted in 32 military fatalities. Following a two month hiatus, Boko Haram activity in Diffa again increased in September, with three attacks claimed within eight days around the village of Toumour; at least 12 people were killed in these assaults.
Islamist militant group, Boko Haram, has taken advantage of the country’s weak governance and porous borders to lead a growing insurgency on Nigerien territory.

This resurgence follows the 4 August Islamic State (IS) appointment of Abu Musab Al Barnawi as the group’s new leader. Since assuming the leadership of the IS-backed Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP) – a rebranded Boko Haram outfit – Al Barnawi has specifically identified Niger as the centre of regional counterinsurgency operations and the future target of attacks. While no security incidents against oil exploration operations have been reported in the southern Agadem basin that extends into the Diffa region as yet, Boko Haram’s renewed Nigerien focus is likely to increase the potential for an attack. Al Barnawi has further claimed humanitarian efforts in the area are a guise by Western forces, posing a potential risk of targeted attacks against aid agencies in the medium term.

Further north, the Algeria and Mali-based militant group, AQIM also seems eager to step up operations in Niger. The group has long been involved in smuggling networks transiting Niger’s poorly governed north and has been linked to several attacks in Niger’s mineral-rich Agadez region. In one of its first attacks in the country, AQIM affiliate, Al Mourabitoun and its then-Malian counterpart, the Mouvement pour l’unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO), claimed responsibility for the May 2013 attacks against the towns of Agadez and Arlit, targeting a military base and French-owned and operated uranium mine. The attacks resulted in 36 deaths and the uranium plant was forced to temporarily shut down amid fears of further attacks.

Although AQIM and affiliate activity in Niger dwindled following the French-led counterinsurgency operation in neighbouring Mali between 2013 and 2014, an intensified AQIM campaign in northern Mali since April 2015 has come with new threats against Niger. Since the start of 2016, there have been reports of at least nine suspected attacks along the border with Mali. In May 2016, for example, AQIM again claimed to have attacked a French-owned mine in Arlit in an assault orchestrated by the group’s southern outfit, Al Nasser. While the Nigerien government denied the attack had taken place and the French company failed to comment on the incident, the account served to demonstrate a renewed intent to target higher profile commercial operations in the region, having come several weeks after a rocket attack against an oil facility in Krechba, Algeria.

Since the start of 2016, there have been reports of at least nine suspected attacks along the border with Mali.

These attacks have been seen as the latest evidence in a pending strategy shift by the group in which AQIM is likely to be looking to move away from its recent preference of attacking ‘soft targets’, including hotels and tourist sites. Recent incidents of this nature include attacks against the Radisson Blu hotel in Mali in November 2015, the Hôtel Splendid in Burkina Faso in January 2016, and the Grand Bassam beach resort area in Côte d’Ivoire in March 2016.

It is clear that Niger is in an increasingly untenable position. The Boko Haram faction, now operating as ISWAP, is expected to escalate activities in Diffa. As its new leadership aims to recoup from losses in Nigeria and Al Barnawi seeks to entrench his role as the group’s new leader, Niger has become a compelling target. Meanwhile, AQIM, which has already set a precedent for launching attacks against mining operations in Niger, is likely to see the country as a convenient playground suited to the implementation of a new strategy centred on high-profile commercial targets.

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