The Cathedral Bombing

On the morning of 27 January, Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) militants detonated two bombs as worshippers gathered at the Cathedral of Our Lady Carmel in Jolo, Sulu Province, killing over 20 people and injuring 102. The fatalities included 15 civilians and five security personnel. In the wake of the attack, President Rodrigo Duterte instructed the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to “Crush ASG by whatever means necessary,” adding that “It’s a movement of evil men. The only way to fight them is to become evil also.” 

Islamic State (IS), which has multiple local affiliate groups in the Philippines including ASG, initially claimed responsibility for the attack, saying it had been carried out by a pair of suicide bombers. Police investigations, however, disproved IS’s claim that it was a suicide attack: video footage showed known ASG militants preparing for the bombing. Both bombs were remotely detonated using a mobile phone. The first bomb was hidden underneath a pew inside the cathedral, and the second was hidden inside a motorcycle parked outside. When the first bomb went off, panicked worshippers rushed outside the second device was then detonated. 

The AFP has since intensified its operations against ASG, resulting in numerous clashes across ASG’s area of operations, especially Sulu Province. The bombings, and the subsequent violent clashes between militants and security forces, cast doubt over the effectiveness of ongoing peace efforts in the southern Philippines, where multiple Islamist, separatist and Maoist insurgent groups have a long-standing presence. The attack occurred just days after a historic plebiscite on the creation of Bangsamoro Autonomous Region, an autonomous Moro-Muslim-majority region in the western half of Mindanao. This agreement is widely considered as key to securing peace in the region. However, these recent bombings, combined with a long history of violence in the region and ongoing military operations targeting ASG and other Islamist and left-wing groups, demonstrate that peace will remain elusive in Mindanao.

Abu Sayyaf and the Islamic State

According to AFP officials, ASG’s Ajang-Ajang faction was responsible for the cathedral bombing. ASG, while often referred to as a single group, contains numerous factions. While all ASG factions profess a commitment to Islamist ideology and have declared allegiance to IS, some are more committed than others to establishing a regional caliphate by partnering with other local Islamist groups. These factions participated in the May-October 2017 invasion of Marawi City, Lanao del Sur Province, in which some 1,200 people were killed, including prominent ASG commander and IS’s “emir” for the Philippines, Isnilon Hapilon.

Other ASG factions, including Ajang-Ajang, prioritise staging attacks at the local level in ASG’s established area of operations, including Sulu, Basilan and Tawi-Tawi provinces. They engage in various localised criminal activities, including drug smuggling, extortion and kidnap for ransom, to fund the broader group’s militant agenda. Indeed, reports indicate that the Ajang-Ajang faction funded the January attack with ransom money gained after kidnapping an Indonesian national in September 2018. In August 2018, Suraka Igog, the faction’s leader and well-known bomb-maker, was killed in a military operation in Patikul, Sulu. AFP military officials say Ajang-Ajang’s primary motive was revenge.

Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL)

On 25 January, just two days before the cathedral bombing in Sulu Province, tens of thousands of people in Muslim-majority parts of Mindanao participated in the plebiscite to ratify the BOL. Over 88 percent of respondents voted to ratify the BOL, which will pave the way for the creation of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Moro-Muslim-majority parts of Mindanao. Mindanao has been wracked by decades-long separatist insurgencies in these areas, and the ratification of the BOL is seen by many as the culmination of a long peace process between the central authorities and the two main separatist Moro-Muslim groups, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

However, the Jolo bombings highlight how, despite the BOL’s ratification, terrorist violence will continue in Mindanao. ASG and other IS-linked groups have expressed opposition to the law, which they see as a compromise with the central authorities, granting the region greater autonomy without complete independence. Central to IS ideology is the creation of a caliphate, which makes a compromise with existing political entities impossible. Moreover, the law will strengthen separatist militant groups, including the MILF, to the detriment of Islamist groups, pitting local separatism against global Islamism. Ideological differences between the various Moro-Muslim camps will likely become a significant driver of conflict in the region. Thus, despite the decades-long lead up to the ratification of the BOL, peace in the southern Philippines remains elusive.