An Unwelcome Call to Arms

On 29 August 2019, two former commanders of Colombia’s demobilised rebel group, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, FARC) declared a return to armed struggle. Going by the aliases of Iván Márquez and Jesús Santrich, the two had been leading figures in the drawn-out peace negotiations between the powerful farleft militant group and the Juan Manuel Santos administration. Ending over five decades of conflict, the 2016 peace deal saw the vast majority of FARC members disarm, demobilise and even enter the country’s legitimate political structures.

Fast forward less than three years, and the intention of Márquez, Santrich and their supporters to resume fighting has sent  ripples through a country still dealing with the fragile nuances of reconciliation. So what has prompted their decision? While some 2,300 FARC dissidents – individuals who opposed the peace deal from the outset – have been active since 2016, many demobilised fighters have become disillusioned with the peace deal’s promises. These included reintegration programmes for ex-rebels bolstered by economic support and assurances of security, among others, in return for demobilisation and disarmament. However, many of these pledges have been slow to materialise in a meaningful way.

A number of factors have contributed to this:

LACK OF POLITICAL WILL

Incumbent president Iván Duque has been a vocal sceptic of the peace deal, taking active steps to curtail it. For example, under his administration, funding for the peace process’s transitional justice mechanism has been cut. Duque has also called for harsher punishments for ex-fighters who committed war crimes during the conflict.

FUNDING SHORTAGES

According to the UN, only 10 percent of demobilised fighters have received promised financing for farming and other development projects. Without such financial support, many individuals have relied on monthly government stipends to survive, unable to effectively reintegrate into the Colombian workforce. This has left them frustrated, disappointed and dissuaded from abandoning illicit means of generating income, such as coca cultivation.

INSECURITY

About a quarter of ex-fighters undergoing a reincorporation programme remain in reintegration camps. This is partially due to their sense of insecurity, including fear of reprisal attacks against demobilised rebels. The UN estimates that approximately 137 former fighters have been killed since the peace deal was signed. Despite commitment from the Duque administration to bolster security measures, many are unconvinced of the government’s willingness and ability to protect them.

Although many leading former FARC members remain committed to the peace process, Márquez and Santrich’s statement – which calls out the Colombian government for “betraying” the terms of the peace deal – is likely to resonate with several disaffected ex-rebels. This raises the prospect of further militant violence in the coming months.

My Enemy's Enemy is my Friend

Splinter groups of FARC dissidents have intermittently attacked security forces and critical infrastructure in Colombia since the signing of the peace deal, but they have also on occasion clashed with competing militant groups. Among these is the 2,000 strong Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army, ELN), a far-left revolutionary group that has grown in strength over recent years by occupying the vacuum left behind by the demobilised FARC. However, recent comments by the dissenting FARC commanders and ELN leadership have pointed to a possible alliance. Márquez, for example, has called for cooperation between the two groups. His move to renege on the peace agreement was also welcomed by an ELN commander.

Recurring Targets

Since the FARC’s withdrawal, the ELN has been at the forefront of attacks against government security targets, and infrastructure, particularly oil pipelines. Attacking pipelines was a preferred FARC tactic during its peak years. In 2014, for example, oil supply disruptions reached their highest point, amounting to 45,000 barrels per day. Intermittent attacks continued even after 2016, and have been on the  rise again since 2017. More recently, in September 2019, suspected militants bombed the Transandino oil pipeline near Orito, Putumayo Department. The bombing ruptured the pipeline and caused a fire. This was reportedly the 18th such attack so far in 2019.

Although past rivals, the ELN and FARC intersect ideologically in many respects, both promoting a farleft revolutionary agenda. Attacks against security forces and strategic government infrastructure or revenue sources will align with both groups’ objectives and are consistent with their preferred tactics and capabilities.

The Primary Threat: Numbers, Coordination and Cooperation

Márquez’s declaration and the threat of a FARC resurgence likely satisfies President Duque’s ongoing desire to appear as Colombia’s strongman, since it gives him an opportunity to respond with force. He may also try to use these developments as further justification for his peace-deal scepticism. However, in so doing, he risks further alienating ex-rebels who are already in two minds about their prospects as reintegrated members of Colombian society, driving them straight into the waiting arms of Márquez. 

Furthermore, if under the command of the likes of Márquez the currently fragmented array of FARC dissident groups is able to unify, the threat becomes a formidable one. Add to this the prospect of cooperation between FARC dissidents and the ELN, and an increase in more coordinated and impactful attacks against their preferred targets is likely over the next 12 months.