Articles
The backlash against China's rise
Anti-China riots in Vietnam were a symptom of widespread resentment in Southeast Asia. Further violence is likely as governments struggle to negotiate territorial disputes and unequal trade relations while answering to their people's demands, writes Alice Shone
It has been a tense month for diplomacy in Southeast Asia, with leaders trading accusations over the South China Sea while at the same time seeking to negotiate the aftermath of the violent civil unrest that erupted in Vietnam in early May. Days after the deployment of a Chinese oil drilling platform to a disputed area of the South China Sea, a series of peaceful anti-China protests in Hanoi rapidly deteriorated into widespread rioting targeting Chinese businesses across the country. The ensuing violence led to the deaths of at least 21 people and the evacuation of more than 3,000 Chinese nationals, as well as the looting, destruction and closure of thousands of businesses, before they were eventually suppressed and hundreds of protesters detained.
With the exception of small rally in Hanoi in early June, protests have since died down. Nevertheless, rhetoric is running high and almost every day brings fresh accusations from one country that the other has been ramming vessels near the drilling platform. . Territorial disputes have also dominated Sino-Philippine relations this month. Beijing accused President Benigno Aquino of creating tension during a one-day trip to Tokyo in which he and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe discussed “collective self-defence” in respect of regional disputes. The Philippines is pushing for a quick UN ruling on its territorial claims while a round of US-Philippine military exercises began in late June. These actions emphasise the government’s determination to counter China, for which it has almost universal popular support. The country’s Independence Day on 12 June saw protesters rally outside the Chinese embassy in Makati, urging the government to defend its sovereignty.
This combination of state-level distrust and popular resentment of China is not confined to countries with territorial disputes. Anti-China sentiment is prevalent in Malaysia, Indonesia and Myanmar, where government fears over trade imbalances converge with popular resentment directed at domestic ethnic Chinese and an influx of Chinese immigrants and cheap Chinese goods.
Tensions are highest in Myanmar, where wealthy Chinese dominate the urban populations of Yangon and Mandalay, driving up prices, and Chinese hydropower and mining projects are displacing communities and threatening environmental destruction.
The Burmese government is seeking to reduce its reliance on China by encouraging investment from elsewhere. In 2011, it defied Beijing by halting construction of the Myitsone Dam in response to popular opposition. The dam is being developed by China Power Investment (CPI), and its location on the Irrawaddy River is considered the cradle of Burmese civilisation. Nevertheless, two further CPI dams on the Irrawaddy were given public approval this month and many fear that the Myitsone project will resume after the general election in 2015. Protests against the dam have been largely peaceful, but in 2010, ten successive explosions targeted the construction site. The government blamed the rebel Kachin Independence Army (KIA). While the KIA have not claimed responsibility, they are openly opposed to the project.
Popular resentment has also focused on the Monywa copper mine, which is jointly operated by the Chinese company Wanbao and a Burmese military-owned holding company. In 2011, officials allowed the mine to expand into the Letpadaung hills, leading to violent confrontations between protesting local residents and police. A compromise negotiated by opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyii has led to accusations of betrayal. Wanbao pledged to contribute two percent of its revenue to the local community, yet protests continue and are repeatedly suppressed.
Wanbao’s pledges form part of a government-led PR strategy. However, Chinese companies will be slow to change and people’s perceptions even slower. Until recently, the Chinese rarely initiated social programmes and those they did were delivered via the government, reinforcing China’s image as prop to the former regime. Further, Chinese initiatives to date have been short-sighted and politicised. Villagers displaced by the Monywa Mine have been rehoused and receive regular food supplies from Wanbao. Yet rations of rice are no replacement for people’s livelihoods and, only this month, two families’ rice supplies were cut off because they had hosted protesters from Yangon in March.
Anti-Chinese sentiment is not a new phenomenon in Southeast Asia and successive governments have sought alternately to suppress and foster popular resentment. Given the high stakes in a region where China is everybody’s largest trading partner, widespread violence remains unlikely. Yet further outbreaks will occur as governments find it increasingly difficult to navigate territorial disputes, maintain trade relations and answer to their people’s demands.