From the Caucasus to Raqqa: Islamic State's Entanglement with Russia

“This message is addressed to you, oh Vladimir Putin. These are your aircraft which you sent to Bashar [Al Assad], and with the help of Allah we will send them back to you… we will liberate Chechnya and all the Caucasus.” These were the words of Islamic State (IS) militants standing atop a captured Russian-made fighter aircraft in a propaganda video released in September 2014. An estimated 2,000 Russian citizens, predominantly from the volatile North Caucasus republics, have travelled to Syria and Iraq to join IS and other militant groups, although the actual number may be less than 1,000. The return of these trained jihadists potentially represents a major threat to Russia. Furthermore, in June 2015, IS announced the creation of a ‘governorate’ in the North Caucasus, led by Rustam Asildarov (known as Abu Mohammad al-Qadari), a former leader in the Caucasus Emirate (CE) jihadist group. Not surprisingly, Russian authorities have clamped down on IS activities on the home front. There have been increased efforts to ban the distribution of extremist propaganda materials. In July 2015, more than 30 suspected IS members and recruiters were arrested in a mosque in Moscow. An unidentified number of IS-affiliated militants have also been killed in counterterrorism operations. Undoubtedly, Russia is wary of a renewed campaign of Islamist militancy – aided by the return of trained jihadists from the Middle East – in the North Caucasus and beyond.  

However, there are reasons to believe that the threat IS poses to Russia’s internal security has been exaggerated. Firstly, the number of Russians who left the country to join IS and the dangers associated with their return has been overstated. This is primarily due to the high number of Chechen fighters in the Middle East, but not all of them travelled from Russia. Many of them came from the Chechen diaspora communities in Europe, who were displaced by the Chechen separatist wars in the 1990s and 2000. Secondly, Russia has intensified border security, making it extremely difficult for these militants to return en masse. To date, only a few militants have reportedly returned; most of them have been apprehended by Russian authorities, who monitor their movements closely.

Thirdly, there is no indication that the majority of militants intend to return to Russia. The relative success of IS on the battlefield increased the group’s appeal. Experienced fighters have settled in IS strongholds including Raqqa, Syria, and are likely to remain deployed to the frontline. Fighting abroad also means the militants’ families, who often bear the brunt of their actions, are less likely to be targeted by Russian security forces. Lastly, far from uniting local jihadists, the emergence of IS has weakened the CE, a group responsible for several high-profile attacks, including the 2011 Domodedovo International Airport bombing in Moscow, which killed 37 people. A number of CE leaders and local branches pledged allegiance to IS recently, and dozens of its militants had travelled to the Middle East. This has created major rifts within the North Caucasus insurgency network, which can only benefit Russian counterterrorism efforts. CE’s decline has also been instigated by the death of its former leader Dokka Umarov in 2014, while his successors Alikshab Kebekov and Magomed Suleimanov were killed by security forces this year. 

In October 2014, the Federal Security Service (FSB) reported that terrorist attacks in the North Caucasus halved year-on-year.  It attributed the decrease in attacks to the effectiveness of its counterterrorism programs. However, a number of media reports claim that members of FSB had aided the outflow of jihadists to the Middle East.  This arguably explains the ease with which some militants, who were under surveillance, attained passports and travelled to IS territories.  Regardless of the validity of such claims, the departure of these militants has undoubtedly contributed to the decrease in terrorist attacks in the last 2-3 years. 

This relative stability in the short-term, however, does not guarantee long-term optimism. In early September, IS reportedly fabricated an attack on a military barrack in the republic Dagestan,  and actual attacks in future cannot be entirely ruled out. Whether fighting under IS or CE banner, North Caucasus militants remain capable of carrying out high-impact, opportunistic attacks, as they have in Chechnya last year. Despite Russia’s strong border security, there is always a possibility that some jihadists will return from the Middle East undetected. Most importantly, the underlying causes of radicalisation in the North Caucasus – limited economic mobility for youth, lack of political accountability and human rights abuses by security forces – remain unaddressed. Poor socio-economic conditions are likely to be exacerbated in the coming months, as much-needed federal subsidies for these regions are reduced due to Russia’s economic downturn. As a result, the threat of instability remains in place in the long-term.